History of the World/History of the World (Bureau Development, Inc.)(1992).BIN/dp/0195/01955.txt

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$Title{History Of The Conquest Of Mexico
Chapter VI. Cortes Emissaries.}
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$Author{Prescott, William H.}
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Title:       History Of The Conquest Of Mexico
Book:        Book IV. Residence In Mexico.
Author:      Prescott, William H.

Chapter VI. Cortes Emissaries.

Proceedings In The Castilian Court. - Preparations Of Velasquez. - Narvaez
Lands In Mexico. - Politic Conduct Of Cortes. - He Leaves The Capital. (1520.)

     Before explaining the nature of the tidings alluded to in the preceding
chapter, it will be necessary to cast a glance over some of the transactions
of an earlier period.  The vessel, which, as the reader may remember, bore
the envoys Puertocarrero and Montejo with the despatches from Vera Cruz,
after touching, contrary to orders, at the northern coast of Cuba, and
spreading the news of the late discoveries, held on its way uninterrupted
towards Spain, and early in October 1519 reached the little port of San
Lucar.  Great was the sensation caused by her arrival and the tidings which
she brought; a sensation scarcely inferior to that created by the original
discovery of Columbus.  For now, for the first time, all the magnificent
anticipations formed of the New World seemed destined to be realized.

     Unfortunately, there was a person in Seville at this time, named Benito
Martin, chaplain of Velasquez, the governor of Cuba.  No sooner did this man
learn the arrival of the envoys, and the particulars of their story, than he
lodged a complaint with the Casa de Contratacion, - the Royal Indian House, -
charging those on board the vessel with mutiny and rebellion against the
authorities of Cuba, as well as with treason to the crown. ^1  In consequence
of his representations, the ship was taken possession of by the public
officers, and those on board were prohibited from removing their own effects,
or anything else, from her.  The envoys were not even allowed the funds
necessary for the expenses of the voyage, nor a considerable sum remitted by
Cortes to his father, Don Martin.  In this embarrassment they had no
alternative but to present themselves, as speedy as possible, before the
emperor, deliver the letters with which they had been charged by the colony,
and seek redress for their own grievances.  They first sought out Martin
Cortes, residing at Medellin, and with him made the best of their way to
court.

[Footnote 1: In the collection of MSS, made by Don Vargas Ponce, former
President of the Academy of History, is a Memorial of this same Benito Martin
to the emperor, setting forth the services of Velasquez and the ingratitude
and revolt of Cortes and his followers.  The paper is without date; written
after the arrival of the envoys, probably at the close of 1519 or the
beginning of the following year.]

     Charles the Fifth was then on his first visit to Spain after his
accession.  It was not a long one; long enough, however, to disgust his
subjects, and, in a great degree, to alienate their affections.  He had
lately received intelligence of his election to the imperial crown of
Germany.  From that hour his eyes were turned to that quarter.  His stay in
the Peninsula was prolonged only that he might raise supplies for appearing
with splendour on the great theatre of Europe.  Every act showed too plainly
that the diadem of his ancestors was held lightly in comparison with the
imperial bauble in which neither his countrymen nor his own posterity could
have the slightest interest.  The interest was wholly personal.

     Contrary to established usage, he had summoned the Castilian cortes to
meet at Compostella, a remote town in the north, which presented no other
advantage than that of being near his place of embarkation. ^1  On his way
thither he stopped some time at Tordesillas, the residence of his unhappy
mother, Joanna "the Mad."  It was here that the envoys from Vera Cruz
presented themselves before him, in March 1520 At nearly the same time, the
treasures brought over by them reached the court, where they excited
unbounded admiration. ^2  Hitherto, the returns from the New World had been
chiefly in vegetable products, which, if the surest, are also the slowest
sources of wealth.  Of gold they had as yet seen but little, and that in its
natural state or wrought into the rudest trinkets.  The courtiers gazed with
astonishment on the large masses of the precious metal, and the delicate
manufacture of the various articles, especially of the richly tinted
feather-work.  And, as they listened to the accounts, written and oral, of
the great Aztec empire, they felt assured that the Castilian ships had at
length reached the golden Indies, which hitherto had seemed to recede before
them.

[Footnote 1: Sandoval, indeed, gives a singular reason, - that of being near
the coast, so as to enable Chievres and the other Flemish bloodsuckers to
escape suddenly, if need were, with their ill-gotten treasures, from the
country.  Hist. de Carlos Quinto, tom. i. p. 203, ed. Pamplona, 1634.]

[Footnote 2: See the letter of Peter Martyr to his noble friend and pupil,
the Marquis de Mondejar, written two months after the arrival of the vessel
from Vera Cruz.  Opus Epist., ep. 650.]

     In this favourable mood there is little doubt the monarch would have
granted the petition of the envoys, and confirmed the irregular proceedings
of the Conquerors, but for the opposition of a person who held the highest
office in the Indian department.  This was Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca,
formerly dean of Seville, now bishop of Burgos.  He was a man of noble
family, and had been intrusted with the direction of the colonial concerns on
the discovery of the New World.  On the establishment of the Royal Council of
the Indies by Ferdinand the Catholic, he had been made its president, and had
occupied that post ever since.  His long continuance in a position of great
importance and difficulty is evidence of capacity for business.  It was no
uncommon thing in that age to find ecclesiastics in high civil, and even
military, employments.  Fonseca appears to have been an active, efficient
person, better suited to a secular than to a religious vocation.  He had,
indeed, little that was religious in his temper; quick to take offence and
slow to forgive.  His resentments seem to have been nourished and perpetuated
like a part of his own nature.  Unfortunately, his peculiar position enabled
him to display them towards some of the most illustrious men of his time.
From pique at some real or fancied slight from Columbus, he had constantly
thwarted the plans of the great navigator.  He had shown the same unfriendly
feeling towards the Admiral's son, Diego, the heir of his honours; and he
now, and from this time forward, showed a similar spirit towards the
Conqueror of Mexico.  The immediate cause of this was his own personal
relations with Velasquez, to whom a near relative was betrothed. ^1

[Footnote 1: Zuniga, Anales eclesiasticos y seculares de Sevilla (Madrid,
1677), fol. 414. - Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 5, cap. 14; lib. 9
cap. 17, et alibi.]

     Through this prelate's representations, Charles, instead of a favourable
answer to the envoys, postponed his decision till he should arrive at Coruna,
the place of embarkation. ^2  But here he was much pressed by the troubles
which his impolitic conduct had raised, as well as by preparations for his
voyage.  The transaction of the colonial business, which, long postponed, had
greatly accumulated on his hands, was reserved for the last week in Spain.
But the affairs of the "young admiral" consumed so large a portion of this,
that he had no time to give to those of Cortes, except, indeed, to instruct
the board at Seville to remit to the envoys so much of their funds as was
required to defray the charges of the voyage.  On the 16th of May 1520 the
impatient monarch bade adieu to his distracted kingdom, without one attempt
to settle the dispute between his belligerent vassals in the New World, and
without an effort to promote the magnificent enterprise which was to secure
to him the possession of an empire.  What a contrast to the policy of his
illustrious predecessors, Ferdinand and Isabella! ^3

[Footnote 2: Velasquez, it appears, had sent home an account of the doings
of Cortes and of the vessel which touched with the treasures at Cuba, as
early as October 1519.  Carta de Velasquez al Lic. Figueroa, MS., Nov. 17,
1519.]

[Footnote 3: "With loud music from clarions and flutes, and with great
demonstrations of joy, they weighed anchor and unfurled their sails to the
wind, leaving unhappy Spain oppressed with sorrows and misfortunes."
Sandoval, Hist. de Carlos Quinto, tom. i. p. 219.]

     The governor of Cuba, meanwhile, without waiting for support from home,
took measures for redress into his own hands.  We have seen in a preceding
chapter how deeply he was moved by the reports of the proceedings of Cortes,
and of the treasures which his vessel was bearing to Spain.  Rage,
mortification, disappointed avarice, distracted his mind.  He could not
forgive himself for trusting the affair to such hands.  On the very week in
which Cortes had parted from him to take charge of the fleet, a capitulation
had been signed by Charles the Fifth, conferring on Velasquez the title of
adelantado, with great augmentation of his original powers. ^4  The governor
resolved, without loss of time, to send such a force to the Mexican coast as
should enable him to assert his new authority to its full extent and to take
vengeance on his rebellious officer.  He began his preparations as early as
October. ^5  At first he proposed to assume the command in person.  But his
unwieldy size, which disqualified him for the fatigues incident to such an
expedition, or, according to his own account, tenderness for his Indian
subjects, then wasted by an epidemic, induced him to devolve the command on
another. ^1

[Footnote 4: The instrument was dated at Barcelona, Nov. 13, 1518.  Cortes
left St. Jago the 18th of the same month.  Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2,
lib. 3, cap. 11.]

[Footnote 5: Gomara (Cronica, cap. 96) and Robertson (History of America,
vol. ii. pp. 304, 466) consider that the new dignity of adelantado stimulated
the governor to this enterprise.  By a letter of his own writing in the Munoz
collection, it appears he had begun operations some months previous to his
receiving notice of his appointment.  Carta de Velasquez al Senor de Xevres,
Isla Fernandina, MS., Octubre 12, 1519.]

[Footnote 1: Carta de Velasquez al Lic. Figueroa, MS., Nov. 17, 1519.]

     The person whom he selected was a Castilian hidalgo, named Panfilo de
Narvaez.  He had assisted Velasquez in the reduction of Cuba, where his
conduct cannot be wholly vindicated from the charge of inhumanity which too
often attaches to the early Spanish adventurers.  From that time he continued
to hold important posts under the government, and was a decided favourite
with Velasquez.  He was a man of some military capacity, though negligent and
lax in his discipline.  He possessed undoubted courage, but it was mingled
with an arrogance, or rather over-weening confidence in his own powers, which
made him deaf to the suggestions of others more sagacious than himself.  He
was altogether deficient in that prudence and calculating foresight demanded
in a leader who was to cope with an antagonist like Cortes. ^2

[Footnote 2: The person of Narvaez is thus whimsically described by Diaz: "He
was tall, stout-limbed, with a large head and red beard, an agreeable
presence, a voice deep and sonorous, as if it rose from a cavern.  He was a
good horseman and valiant."  Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 205.]

     The governor and his lieutenant were unwearied in their efforts to
assemble an army.  They visited every considerable town in the island,
fitting out vessels, laying in stores and ammunition, and encouraging
volunteers to enlist by liberal promises.  But the most effectual bounty was
the assurance of the rich treasures that awaited them in the golden regions
of Mexico.  So confident were they in this expectation, that all classes and
ages vied with one another in eagerness to embark in the expedition, until it
seemed as if the whole white population would desert the island and leave it
to its primitive occupants. ^3

[Footnote 3: The danger of such a result is particularly urged in a
memorandum of the licentiate Ayllon.  Carta al Emperador Guaniguanico, Marzo
4, 1520, MS.]

     The report of these proceedings soon spread through the Islands, and
drew the attention of the Royal Audience of St. Domingo.  This body was
intrusted, at that time, not only with the highest judicial authority in the
colonies, but with a civil jurisdiction, which, as "the Admiral" complained,
encroached on his own rights.  The tribunal saw with alarm the proposed
expedition of Velasquez, which, whatever might be its issue in regard to the
parties, could not fail to compromise the interests of the crown.  They chose
accordingly one of their number, the licentiate Ayllon, a man of prudence and
resolution, and despatched him to Cuba, with instructions to interpose his
authority, and stay, if possible, the proceedings of Velasquez. ^4

[Footnote 4: Processo y Pesquiza hecha por la Real Audiencia de la Espanola,
Santo Domingo, Diciembre 24, 1519, MS.]

     On his arrival he found the governor in the western part of the island,
busily occupied in getting the fleet ready for sea.  The licentiate explained
to him the purport of his mission, and the views entertained of the proposed
enterprise by the Royal Audience.  The conquest of a powerful country like
Mexico required the whole force of the Spaniards, and, if one half were
employed against the other, nothing but ruin could come of it.  It was the
governor's duty, as a good subject, to forego all private animosities, and to
sustain those now engaged in the great work by sending them the necessary
supplies.  He might, indeed, proclaim his own powers and demand obedience to
them.  But, if this were refused, he should leave the determination of his
dispute to the authorized tribunals, and employ his resources in prosecuting
discovery in another direction, instead of hazarding all by hostilities with
his rival.

     This admonition, however sensible and salutary, was not at all to the
taste of the governor.  He professed, indeed, to have no intention of coming
to hostilities with Cortes.  He designed only to assert his lawful
jurisdiction over territories discovered under his own auspices.  At the same
time, he denied the right of Ayllon or of the Royal Audience to interfere in
the matter.  Narvaez was still more refractory, and, as the fleet was now
ready, proclaimed his intention to sail in a few hours.  In this state of
things, the licentiate, baffled in his first purpose of staying the
expedition, determined to accompany it in person, that he might prevent, if
possible, by his presence, an open rupture between the parties. ^1

[Footnote 1: Parecer del Lic. Ayllon al Adelantado Diego Velasquez, Isla
Fernandina, 1520, MS.]

     The squadron consisted of eighteen vessels, large and small.  It carried
nine hundred men, eighty of whom were cavalry, eighty more arquebusiers, one
hundred and fifty crossbowmen, with a number of heavy guns, and a large
supply of ammunition and military stores.  There were, besides, a thousand
Indians, natives of the island, who went, probably, in a menial capacity. ^2
So gallant an armada - with one exception ^3 - never before rode in the
Indian seas.  None to compare with it had ever been fitted out in the Western
World.

[Footnote 2: Relacion del Lic. Ayllon, Santo Domingo, 30 de Agosto, 1520,
MS. - Processo y Pezquiza por la Real Audiencia, MS. - According to Diaz, the
ordnance amounted to twenty cannon.  Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 109.]

[Footnote 3: The great fleet under Ovando, 1501, in which Cortes had intended
to embark for the New World.  Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 1, lib. 4, cap.
11.]

     Leaving Cuba early in March 1520, Narvaez held nearly the same course as
Cortes, and running down what was then called the "island of Yucatan," ^4
after a heavy tempest, in which some of his smaller vessels foundered,
anchored, April 23, off San Juan de Ulua.  It was the place where Cortes,
also, had first landed, the sandy waste covered by the present city of Vera
Cruz.

[Footnote 4: "De alli seguimos el viage por toda la costa de la Isla de
Yucatan."  Relacion del Lic. Ayllon, MS.]

     Here the commander met with a Spaniard, one of those sent by the general
from Mexico to ascertain the resources of the country, especially its mineral
products.  This man came on board the fleet, and from him the Spaniards
gathered the particulars of all that had occurred since the departure of the
envoys from Vera Cruz, - the march into the interior, the bloody battles
with the Tlascalans, the occupation of Mexico, the rich treasures found in
it, and the seizure of the monarch, by means of which, concluded the soldier,
"Cortes rules over the land like its own sovereign, so that a Spaniard may
travel unarmed from one end of the country to the other, without insult or
injury." ^1  His audience listened to this marvellous report with speechless
amazement, and the loyal indignation of Narvaez waxed stronger and stronger,
as he learned the value of the prize which had been snatched from his
employer.

[Footnote 1: "La cual tierra sabe e ha visto este testigo, que el dicho
Hernando Cortes tiene pacifica, e le sirven e obedecen todos los Indios; e
que cree este testigo que lo hacen por cabsa que el dicho Hernando Cortes
tiene preso a un Cacique que dicen Montesuma, que es Senor de lo mas de la
tierra, a lo que este testigo alcanza, al cual los Indios obedecen, e facen
lo que les manda, e los Cristianos andan por toda esta tierra seguros, e un
solo Cristiano la ha atravesado toda sin temor."  Processo y Pesquiza hecha
por la Real Audiencia de la Espanola, MS.]

     He now openly proclaimed his intention to march against Cortes and
punish him for his rebellion.  He made this vaunt so loudly, that the
natives, who had flocked in numbers to the camp, which was soon formed on
shore, clearly comprehended that the new-comers were not friends, but
enemies, of the preceding.  Narvaez determined, also, - though in opposition
to the counsel of the Spaniard, who quoted the example of Cortes, - to
establish a settlement on this unpromising spot; and he made the necessary
arrangements to organize a municipality.  He was informed by the soldier of
the existence of the neighbouring colony at Villa Rica, commanded by
Sandoval, and consisting of a few invalids, who, he was assured, would
surrender on the first summons.  Instead of marching against the place,
however, he determined to send a peaceful embassy to display his powers and
demand the submission of the garrison. ^2

[Footnote 2: Relacion de Lic. Ayllon, MS. - Demanda de Zavallos en nombre de
Narvaez, MS.]

     These successive steps gave serious displeasure to Ayllon, who saw they
must lead to inevitable collision with Cortes.  But it was in vain he
remonstrated and threatened to lay the proceedings of Narvaez before the
government.  The latter, chafed by his continued opposition and sour rebuke,
determined to rid himself of a companion who acted as a spy on his movements.
He caused him to be seized and sent back to Cuba.  The licentiate had the
address to persuade the captain of the vessel to change her destination for
St. Domingo; and, when he arrived there, a formal report of his proceedings,
exhibiting in strong colours the disloyal conduct of the governor and his
lieutenant, was prepared, and despatched by the Royal Audience to Spain. ^3

[Footnote 3: This report is to be found among the MSS. of Vargas Ponce, in
the archives of the Royal Academy of History.  It embraces a hundred and ten
folio pages, and is entitled "El Processo y Pesquiza hecha por la Real
Audiencia de la Espanola e tierra nuevamente descubierta.  Para el Consejo de
su Majestad."]

     Sandoval meanwhile had not been inattentive to the movements of Narvaez.
From the time of his first appearance on the coast, that vigilant officer,
distrusting the object of the armament, had kept his eye on him.  No sooner
was he apprised of the landing of the Spaniards, than the commander of Villa
Rica sent off his few disabled soldiers to a place of safety in the
neighbourhood.  He then put his works in the best posture of defence that he
could, and prepared to maintain the place to the last extremity.  His men
promised to stand by him, and, the more effectually to fortify the resolution
of any who might falter, he ordered a gallows to be set up in a conspicuous
part of the town!  The constancy of his men was not put to the trial.

     The only invaders of the place were a priest, a notary, and four other
Spaniards, selected for the mission, already noticed, by Narvaez.  The
ecclesiastic's name was Guevara.  On coming before Sandoval, he made him a
formal address, in which he pompously enumerated the services and claims of
Velasquez, taxed Cortes and his adherents with rebellion, and demanded of
Sandoval to tender his submission, as a loyal subject, to the newly
constituted authority of Narvaez.

     The commander of La Villa Rica was so much incensed at this
unceremonious mention of his companions in arms that he assured the reverend
envoy that nothing but respect for his cloth saved him from the chastisement
he merited.  Guevara now waxed wroth in his turn, and called on the notary to
read the proclamation.  But Sandoval interposed, promising that functionary
that if he attempted to do so, without first producing a warrant of his
authority from the crown, he should be soundly flogged.  Guevara lost all
command of himself at this, and, stamping on the ground, repeated his orders
in a more peremptory tone than before.  Sandoval was not a man of many words.
He simply remarked that the instrument should be read to the general himself
in Mexico.  At the same time, he ordered his men to procure a number of
sturdy tamanes, or Indian porters, on whose backs the unfortunate priest and
his companions were bound like so many bales of goods.  They were then placed
under a guard of twenty Spaniards, and the whole caravan took its march for
the capital.  Day and night they travelled, stopping only to obtain fresh
relays of carriers; and as they passed through populous towns, forests, and
cultivated fields, vanishing as soon as seen, the Spaniards, bewildered by
the strangeness of the scene, as well as of their novel mode of conveyance,
hardly knew whether they were awake or in a dream.  In this way, at the end
of the fourth day, they reached the Tezcucan lake in view of the Aztec
capital. ^1

[Footnote 1: E iban espantados de que veian tatas ciudades y pueblos grandes,
que les traian de comer, y vnos los dexavan, y otros los tomavan, y andar por
su camino.  Dize que iban pensando si era en cantamiento, o sueno."  Bernal
Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 111. - Demanda de Zavallos, MS.]

     Its inhabitants had already been made acquainted with the fresh arrival
of white men on the coast.  Indeed, directly on their landing, intelligence
had been communicated to Montezuma, who is said (it does not seem probable)
to have concealed it some days from Cortes. ^2  At length, inviting him to an
interview, he told him there was no longer any obstacle to his leaving the
country, as a fleet was ready for him.  To the inquiries of the astonished
general, Montezuma replied by pointing to a hieroglyphical map sent him from
the coast, on which the ships, the Spaniards themselves, and their whole
equipment were minutely delineated.  Cortes, suppressing all emotions but
those of pleasure, exclaimed.  "Blessed be the Redeemer for his mercies!"  On
returning to his quarters, the tidings were received by the troops with loud
shouts, the firing of cannon, and other demonstrations of joy.  They hailed
the new-comers as a reinforcement from Spain.  Not so their commander.  From
the first, he suspected them to be sent by his enemy, the governor of Cuba.
He communicated his suspicions to his officers, through whom they gradually
found their way among the men.  The tide of joy was instantly checked.
Alarming apprehensions succeeded, as they dwelt on the probability of this
suggestion and on the strength of the invaders.  Yet their constancy did not
desert them; and they pledged themselves to remain true to their cause, and,
come what might, to stand by their leader.  It was one of those occasions
that proved the entire influence which Cortes held over these wild
adventures.  All doubts were soon dispelled by the arrival of the prisoners
from Villa Rica.

[Footnote 2: "Ya auia tres dias que lo sabia el Montecuma y Cortes no sabia
cosa ninguna."  Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 110.]

     One of the convoy, leaving the party in the suburbs, entered the city,
and delivered a letter to the general from Sandoval, acquainting him with all
the particulars.  Cortes instantly sent to the prisoners, ordered them to be
released, and furnished them with horses to make their entrance into the
capital, - a more creditable conveyance than the backs of tamanes.  On their
arrival, he received them with marked courtesy, apologized for the rude
conduct of his officers, and seemed desirous by the most assiduous attentions
to soothe the irritation of their minds.  He showed his goodwill still
further by lavishing presents on Guevara and his associates, until he
gradually wrought such a change in their dispositions that from enemies he
converted them into friends, and drew forth many important particulars
respecting not merely the designs of their leader, but the feelings of his
army.  The soldiers, in general, they said, far from desiring a rupture with
those of Cortes, would willingly co-operate with them, were it not for their
commander.  They had no feelings of resentment to gratify.  Their object was
gold.  The personal influence of Narvaez was not great, and his arrogance and
penurious temper had already gone far to alienate from him the affections of
his followers.  These hints were not lost on the general.

     He addressed a letter to his rival in the most conciliatory terms.  He
besought him not to proclaim their animosity to the world, and, by kindling a
spirit of insubordination in the natives, unsettle all that had been so far
secured.  A violent collision must be prejudicial even to the victor, and
might be fatal to both.  It was only in union that they could look for
success.  He was ready to greet Narvaez as a brother in arms, to share with
him the fruits of conquest, and, if he could produce a royal commission, to
submit to his authority.  Cortes well knew he had no such commission to
show. ^1

[Footnote 1: Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47. - Rel. Seg. de
Cortes, ap. Lorenzana, pp. 117-120.]

     Soon after the departure of Guevara and his comrades, ^1 the general
determined to send a special envoy of his own.  The person selected for this
delicate office was Father Olmedo, who, through the campaign, had shown a
practical good sense, and a talent for affairs, not always to be found in
persons of his spiritual calling.  He was intrusted with another epistle to
Narvaez, of similar import with the preceding.  Cortes wrote, also, to the
licentiate Ayllon, with whose departure he was not acquainted, and to Andres
de Duero, former secretary of Velasquez, and his own friend, who had come
over in the present fleet.  Olmedo was instructed to converse with these
persons in private, as well as with the principal officers and soldiers, and,
as far as possible, to infuse into them a spirit of accommodation.  To give
greater weight to his arguments, he was furnished with a liberal supply of
gold.

[Footnote 1: "Our commander said so many kind things to them," says Diaz,
"and anointed their fingers so plentifully with gold, that, though they came
like roaring lions, they went home perfectly tame!"  Hist. de la Conquista,
cap. 111.]

     During this time, Narvaez had abandoned his original design of planting
a colony on the sea-coast, and had crossed the country to Cempoalla, where he
had taken up his quarters.  He was here when Guevara returned and presented
the letter of Cortes.

     Narvaez glanced over it with a look of contempt, which was changed into
one of stern displeasure as his envoy enlarged on the resources and
formidable character of his rival, counselling him by all means to accept his
proffers of amity.  A different effect was produced on the troops, who
listened with greedy ears to the accounts given of Cortes, his frank and
liberal manners, which they involuntarily contrasted with those of their own
commander, the wealth in his camp, where the humblest private could stake his
ingot and chain of gold at play, where all revelled in plenty, and the life
of the soldier seemed to be one long holiday.  Guevara had been admitted only
to the sunny side of the picture.

     The impression made by these accounts was confirmed by the presents of
Olmedo.  The ecclesiastic delivered his missives, in like manner, to Narvaez,
who ran through their contents with feelings of anger which found vent in the
most opprobrious invectives against his rival; while one of his captains,
named Salvatierra, openly avowed his attention to cut off the rebel's ears
and broil them for his breakfast! ^2  Such impotent sallies did not alarm the
stout-hearted friar, who soon entered into communication with many of the
officers and soldiers, whom he found better inclined to an accommodation.
His insinuating eloquence, backed by his liberal largesses, gradually opened
a way into their hearts, and a party was formed, under the very eye of their
chief, better affected to his rival's interests than to his own.  The
intrigue could not be conducted so secretly as wholly to elude the suspicions
of Narvaez, who would have arrested Olmedo and placed him under confinement,
but for the interposition of Duero.  He put a stop to his further
machinations by sending him back again to his master.  But the poison was
left to do its work.

[Footnote 2: Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. II.]

     Narvaez made the same vaunt as at his landing, of his design to march
against Cortes and apprehend him as a traitor.  The Cempoallans learned with
astonishment that their new guests, though the countrymen, were enemies of
their former.  Narvaez, also, proclaimed his intention to release Montezuma
from captivity and restore him to his throne.  It is said he received a rich
present from the Aztec emperor, who entered into a correspondence with him. ^1
That Montezuma should have treated him with his usual munificence, supposing
him to be the friend of Cortes, is very probable.  But that he should have
entered into a secret communication, hostile to the general's interests, is
too repugnant to the whole tenor of his conduct to be lightly
admitted.

[Footnote 1: Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. III. - Oviedo says that
Montezuma called a council of his nobles, in which it was decided to let the
troops of Narvaez into the capital, and then to crush them at one blow, with
those of Cortes!  (Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.)  Considering
the awe in which the latter alone were held by the Mexicans, a more
improbable tale could not be devised.  But nothing is too improbable for
history, - though, according to Boileau's maxim, it may be for fiction.]

     These proceedings did not escape the watchful eye of Sandoval.  He
gathered the particulars partly from deserters who fled to Villa Rica, and
partly from his own agents, who in the disguise of natives mingled in the
enemy's camp.  He sent a full account of them to Cortes, acquainted him with
the growing defection of the Indians, and urged him to take speedy measures
for the defence of Villa Rica if he would not see it fall into the enemy's
hands.  The general felt that it was time to act.

     Yet the selection of the course to be pursued was embarrassing in the
extreme.  If he remained in Mexico and awaited there the attack of his rival,
it would give the latter time to gather round him the whole forces of the
empire, including those of the capital itself, all willing, no doubt, to
serve under the banners of a chief who proposed the liberation of their
master.  The odds were too great to be hazarded.

     If he marched against Narvaez, he must either abandon the city and the
emperor, the fruit of all his toils and triumphs, or, by leaving a garrison
to hold them in awe, must cripple his strength, already far too weak to cope
with that of his adversary.  Yet on this latter course he decided.  He
trusted less, perhaps, to an open encounter of arms than to the influence of
his personal address and previous intrigues, to bring about an amicable
arrangement.  But he prepared himself for either result.

     In the preceding chapter it was mentioned that Velasquez de Leon was
sent with a hundred and fifty men to plant a colony on one of the great
rivers emptying into the Mexican Gulf.  Cortes, on learning the arrival of
Narvaez, had despatched a messenger to his officer, to acquaint him with the
fact and to arrest his further progress.  But Velasquez had already received
notice of it from Narvaez himself, who, in a letter written soon after his
landing, had adjured him in the name of his kinsman, the governor of Cuba, to
quit the banners of Cortes and come over to him.  That officer, however, had
long since buried the feelings of resentment which he had once nourished
against his general, to whom he was now devotedly attached, and who had
honoured him throughout the campaign with particular regard.  Cortes had
early seen the importance of securing this cavalier to his interests.
Without waiting for orders, Velasquez abandoned his expedition, and commenced
a countermarch on the capital, when he received the general's commands to
await him in Cholula.

     Cortes had also sent to the distant province of Chinantla, situated far
to the south-east of Cholula, for a reinforcement of two thousand natives.
They were a bold race, hostile to the Mexicans, and had offered their
services to him since his residence in the metropolis.  They used a long
spear in battle, longer, indeed, than that borne by the Spanish or German
infantry.  Cortes ordered three hundred of their double-headed lances to be
made for him, and to be tipped with copper instead of itztli.  With this
formidable weapon he proposed to foil the cavalry of his enemy.

     The command of the garrison in his absence he intrusted to Pedro de
Alvarado, - the Tonatiuh of the Mexicans, - a man possessed of many
commanding qualities, of an intrepid though somewhat arrogant spirit, and his
warm personal friend.  He inculcated on him moderation and forbearance.  He
was to keep a close watch on Montezuma, for on the possession of the royal
person rested all their authority in the land.  He was to show him the
deference alike due to his high station and demanded by policy.  He was to
pay uniform respect to the usages and the prejudices of the people;
remembering that though his small force would be large enough to overawe them
in times of quiet, yet should they be once roused it would be swept away like
chaff before the whirlwind.

     From Montezuma he exacted a promise to maintain the same friendly
relations with his lieutenant which he had preserved towards himself.  This,
said Cortes, would be most grateful to his own master, the Spanish sovereign.
Should the Aztec prince do otherwise, and lend himself to any hostile
movement, he must be convinced that he would fall the first victim of it.

     The emperor assured him of his continued goodwill.  He was much
perplexed, however, by the recent events.  Were the Spaniards at his court,
or those just landed, the true representatives of their sovereign?  Cortes,
who had hitherto maintained a reserve on the subject, now told him that the
latter were indeed his countrymen, but traitors to his master.  As such, it
was his painful duty to march against them, and, when he had chastised their
rebellion, he should return, before his departure from the land, in triumph
to the capital.  Montezuma offered to support him with five thousand Aztec
warriors; but the general declined it, not choosing to encumber himself with
a body of doubtful, perhaps disaffected, auxiliaries.

     He left in garrison, under Alvarado, one hundred and forty men, two
thirds of his whole force. ^1  With these remained all the artillery, the
greater part of the little body of horse, and most of the arquebusiers.  He
took with him only seventy soldiers, but they were men of the most mettle in
the army and his stanch adherents.  They were lightly armed, and encumbered
with as little baggage as possible.  Everything depended on celerity of
movement.

[Footnote 1: In the Mexican edition of the letters of Cortes, it is called
five hundred men.  (Rel. Seg., ap. Lorenzana, p. 122.)  But this was more
than his whole Spanish force.  In Ramusio's version of the same letter,
printed as early as 1565, the number is stated as in the text.  (Navigationi
et Viaggi, fol. 244.)  In an instrument without date, containing the
affidavits of certain witnesses as to the management of the royal fifth by
Cortes, it is said there were one hundred and fifty soldiers left in the
capital under Alvarado.  (Probanza fecha en la nueva Espana del mar oceano a
pedimento de Juan Ochoa de Lexalde, en nombre de Hernando Cortes, MS.)  The
account in the Mexican edition is unquestionably an error.]

     Montezuma, in his royal litter, borne on the shoulders of his nobles,
and escorted by the whole Spanish infantry, accompanied the general to the
causeway.  There, embracing him in the most cordial manner, they parted, with
all the external marks of mutual regard.  It was about the middle of May
1520, more than six months since the entrance of the Spaniards into Mexico.
During this time they had lorded it over the land with absolute sway.  They
were now leaving the city in hostile array, not against an Indian foe, but
their own countrymen.  It was the beginning of a long career of calamity, -
checkered, indeed, by occasional triumphs, - which was yet to be run before
the Conquest could be completed. ^2

[Footnote 2: Carta de la Villa de Vera Cruz a el Emperador, MS.  This letter
without date was probably written in 1520. - See, also, for the preceding
pages, Probanza fecha a pedimento de Juan Ochoa, MS., - Herrera, Hist.
general, dec. 2, lib. 9, cap. 1, 21; lib. 10, cap. 1, - Rel. Seg. de Cortes,
ap. Lorenzana, pp. 119, 120, - Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap.
112-115, - Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.]